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of the clause. Recall that under a strict interpretation of
8(d) (4), the term "expiration date" means only the date when
all rights and duties under the contract cease. If subjected to
such an interpretation a union with a three-year contract containing a provision for annual reopenings would be unable to
strike to enforce demands made during the reopenings. With the
union's hands tied by statute the company could reject any demands made without fear of union reprisal. In this situation
equality of bargaining power, a prime requisite for effective
collective bargaining," is destroyed, although one of the purposes
of the Taft-Hartley Act is to provide for such equality.9 Moreover, if unions shunned long-term agreements, little progress
could be made toward the stabilization of industry sought by the
Congress that enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.10
F. R. Godwin
LOUISIANA PRACTICEEXCEPTIONS OF WANT OF CAPACITY AND
No RIGHT OF ACTION DISTINGUISHED

Plaintiff, a married woman suing in her own name, appealed
from an adverse decision in a petitory action. The court of appeal
reversed the decision of the trial court and decreed plaintiff to be
owner of the property in question. On application for rehearing,
in the court of appeal,' defendant filed an exception of "no right
and no cause of action" on the ground that the property was
presumably community property and the plaintiff had no standing to sue. The exception was overruled by the court, since it
felt the exception was more appropriately an exception of want
of capacity, which being dilatory, had to be filed in limine litis.2
In response to the contention that the exception questioned plaintiff's right of action, the court was of the opinion that the record
clearly established the property in question as part of the wife's
separate and paraphernal estate. 'The Supreme Court granted
writs of review, and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal. On rehearing, the Supreme Court held that an exception
which questions the right or interest of a married woman to file
8. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 449 (1949): "Another requirement for successful bargaining is that both sides should be of relatively equal strength. There can be no actual bargaining when the employers'
group dominates the union, and vice versa."
9. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1947).
10. Ibid.
1. Stevens v. Johnson, 81 So.2d 464 (La. App. 1955).
2. Id. at 469.
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a petitory action and stand in judgment in cases involving property acquired during marriage is the peremptory exception of
no right of action and not the dilatory exception of want of

capacity. The case was remanded to the district court solely for
the purpose of trial and decision on the exception of no right of
action, with an order to the judge to dismiss the suit if the exception was well founded. Stevens v. Johnson, 230 La. 101, 87
So.2d 743 (1956).
Louisiana courts have been troubled for years in distinguish-

ing the exceptions of want of interest, no right of action, and
want of capacity. Although the exceptions of want of interest
and no right of action developed separately 3 and evolved as a
part of Louisiana procedure at different periods, 4 they have come
to be regarded as no more than dual names for the same exception.5 This peremptory exception, now generally referred to

as an exception of no right of action, presently serves to raise
3. Commercial National Bank v. Sanders, 132 La. 174, 177, 61 So. 155, 156
(1913) ; Ramos Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Labarre, 116 La. 559, 40 So. 898 (1906) ;
Derouen v. Hebert, 46 La. Ann. 1388, 1391 (1894) ; Prevost v. Martel, 10 Rob.
512, 515 (La. 1845) ; State v. Desforges, 5 Rob. 253, 258 (La. 1843). For a detailed discussion of the history of these two exceptions, see McMahon, Parties
Litigant in Louisiana, 11 TUL. L. REV. 527-33 (1937).
4. The exception of want of interest had its inception in our system of procedure quite early and is of continental civilian origin. It was a peremptory
exception relating to law challenging the plaintiff's interest in litigation. Brown
& Sons v. Saul, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 434, 16 Am. Dec. 175 (1826). Cf. LA. CODE OF
'PRAcTICE arts. 345, 346 (1870) ; MOMAHoN, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 453-60 (1939).
In the Brown case, the court, during trial, noticed on its own motion the want
of interest of certain intervenors, although no exception had been filed. The exception of no right of action made its appearance later, evolving as a concomitant of the exception of no cause of action. McMahon, Parties Litigant in
Louisiana, 11 TUL. L. REV. 527-33 (1937).
5. Wischer v. Madison Realty Co., 92 So.2d 589, 591 (La. 1956) ; Roy 0.
Martin Lumber Co. v. St. Denis Securities Co., 225 La. 51, 72 So.2d 257 (1954) :
Ritsch Alluvial Land Co. v. Adema, 211 La. 675, 30 So.2d 753 (1947) ; Outdoor
Electric Advertising v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So.2d 375 (1945); Leteff v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 82 So.2d 80, 82 (La. App. 1955). While there is some
tendency on the part of the bench and bar to treat the exceptions of no right of
action and no cause of action as if they were synonymous, such is not the case.
If it appears that a plaintiff has an actual interest in the outcome of the case,
then he has a right of action. No cause of action, on the other hand, presents
the issue of whether or not sufficient grounds for obtaining the desired relief
are alleged in the petition. Terminal v. McCormick, 208 La. 221, 23 So.2d
52, 55 (1945) ; Brooks v. Smith, 35 So.2d 613 (La. App. 1948). Some of the
language in the Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. case was questioned by Professor
McMahon in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 TermProfessor McCivil Procedure, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 376, 381 (1955).
Mahon pointed out that the court, in describing the function of the exception of
no right of action, spoke in terms of capacity to sue, which usage might serve.to
confuse the function of the exception of no right of action with that of the exception to procedural capacity. Since that writing, the language of the Martin case
has been repeated in some subsequent cases. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Comm. v.
E. R. Kiper Gas Corp., 229 La. 640, 646, 86 So.2d 518, 520, n. 2 (1956) ; Wischer
v. Madison Realty Co., 92 So.2d 589, 590 (La. 1956).
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the question of whether the plaintiff has any interest in judicially enforcing the right asserted. 6 The exception of want of procedural capacity, however, questions the authority of a plaintiff
who Appears in a representative capacity, or in the case where
the Plaintiff appears individually, kaises the issue of whether
he hag the legal capacity to institute and prosecute his suit, and
to stand in jlidgment therein.7 The exception is a dilatory one
and must be filed in limine. 8 The real difference between the
exception of no right of action and that of want of capacity is
that the fitfier challenges the plaintiff's ownership of of intefiest in the claim sued on, while the exception of wafnt of
capacity dhalienges the authority of the plaintiff to institute and
pr6secuxte the stilt regardless of whether the plaintiff owns or
has an interest in the claim sued on.9 An exception of want of
cApacity is raised when the plaintiff is alleged to be undef some
disability, such as minority or interdiction, which prevents him
fro6i suing Unassisted; or, where suit is brought through a representative who is alleged to have no authority to represent the
plaintiff, as in the case of a tutor who has not been properly
appointed or confirmed.10 While there has been some confusion
ih distinguishing between the exception of no right of action
and the exception of want of capacity the line of distinction now
seeiiis reasonably cleat.
In the instant case, the rulliig of the court 5h the exception
is in c6nsohance with the prior jurisprudence on the subject.
Under this well-established line of authority, it has been held
that the eXception of no right of action, and not the exception
of want of capacity, is- the proper Vehicle for challenging an
action brought by a married woman, in her own name, involving
property which could be found to be community property. 1 How6. Termini v. McCormick, 208 La. 221, 23 So.2d 52 (1945) ; Tichenor v. Dr.
G. H. Tichedor Antiseptic Co., 180 La. 119, 156 So. 194 (1934) ; Succession of

Breaux, 168 La. 712, 123 So. 300 (1929).
7. Riche v. Ascension Parish Sch6ol Board, 200 So. 681 (La. App. 1941)
McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisiana, 11 Tut. L. REV. 527, 548 (1937).
8. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE ait. 333 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1936, No.

124,

p.

386; Cartwright v. Phissigur, 125 La. 700, 51 So. 692 (1910); Wiseman

v. Begnaud, 35 So.2d 836 (La. App. 1948) ; Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Cahullette Shiibuilding Co., 195 So. 114 (La. App. 1940).

9. Riche v. Ascension Parish School Board, 200 So. 681 (La. App. 1941).
10. McVay v. New Orleans Public Service, 148 So. 67 (La. App.
Campbell v. New Orleans City R.R., 104 La. 183; 186, 28 So. 985, 986
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 12 La. 617, 618 (1838) ; Harper i. Destiehan,
(N.S.) 389 (La; 1824) ; Riche v. Ascension Parish School Bodidi 200
(La. App. 1941).

1933)
(1900)
2 Mart.
So. 081

11; SUccesgion of Howell, 177 La. 276; 148 So. 48 (1933) ; Casente v. Lloyd,
68 So;2d 329 (La. App. 1953) ; Hanid v. Coker, 11 So.2d 272; 274 (La. Abp.
1942).
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ever, the court of appeal, on rehearing, was of the opinion that
the exception of no right of action and no cause of action filed by
the defendant was "more properly an exception of want of capacity to sue.' 1 2 The Supreme Court, in overturning the court
of appeal's ruling on the exception, properly regarded the exception as one of no right of action. 1 . The real question was not
the plaintiff's capacity to sue but was, in fact, whether she had a
justiciable interest in the property in question.. Plaintiff was
suing to have property acquired during marriage declared her
separate property. There was no allegation that she was suing
for the community, or as agent for her husband as head and
master of the community, nor was there any issue as to her
individual capacity to sue. Therefore, the exception was directed
toward the question of whether she had an interest in having
this property adjudicated to herself. This situation is not to be
confused with the case where a wife purports, as agent for the
community, to sue on a compiunity cause of action. In such a
case, the proper exception might well be one of want of capacity.14 Pretermitting that question, however, the proper ex.
ception for challenging plaintiff's interest in the property and
determining, whether it was in fact separate or community property appears to be that of no right of action. If plaintiff, on
trial of the exception, can adduce sufficient evidence to establish
the property as part of her paraphernal effects, then the e xcep,tion should be overruled; if not, it should be sustained.
Richard F. Knight
LOUISIANA PRATICE-E - RES JUDICATA -. M ATT.RkS
WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN PLEADED

Plaintiffs sued to have a probated olographic will declared a
nullity. The controversy had. been before the court on two prior
occasions. In the first suit the will was attacked on the grQund
that the imposition of one numeral over another made the date
uncertain, but it was held that the date was adequate. A second
12. Steens 7. Johnson, 81 So.2d 469 (La. App. 1955). While the opi.ni.on of
the court of appeal is not entirely clear, the court seemed to indicate that, even
accepting defendant's contention that the exception was one of no right of action,
it was not well founded because the record furnished evidence to rebut the pre-

uqmption that the property involved was community property.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. For a discussion of this point, see MC AHoN, LqulsrANA PR4qTiCE 30-31
(Supp. 1956).

